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ABSTRACT
Using runtime execution artifacts to identify malware and its asso-
ciated “family” is an established technique in the security domain.
Many papers in the literature rely on explicit features derived from
network, file system, or registry interaction. While effective, the use
of these fine-granularity data points makes these techniques com-
putationally expensive. Moreover, the signatures and heuristics are
often circumvented by subsequent malware authors. In this work,
we propose Chatter, a system that is concerned only with the order
in which high-level system events take place. Individual events are
mapped onto an alphabet and execution traces are captured via terse
concatenations of those letters. Then, leveraging an analyst labeled
corpus of malware, n-gram document classification techniques are
applied to produce a classifier predicting malware family. This paper
describes that technique and its proof-of-concept evaluation. In its
prototype form only network events are considered and eleven mal-
ware families are used. We show the technique achieves 83%-94%
accuracy in isolation and makes non-trivial performance improve-
ments when integrated with a baseline classifier of combined order
features to reach an accuracy of up to 98.8%.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Malware has emerged as a challenging threat with the increased
infection rates and levels of sophistication [1–3]. Examples of such
threats include data exfiltration [4], denial-of-service attacks [5],
and espionage [6], among many others. In order to defend against
malware threats, the research community has spent a tremendous
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amount of efforts understanding their behavior so that detection, clas-
sification, and labeling of malware are performed with high accuracy
using analysis techniques [7–13]. Threat information sharing for
the improvement of the malware detection system by collecting and
sharing more information also has been actively studied [14–16].
Malware analysis aims to inspect binaries in various ways, and
techniques fall mainly into two categories: static and dynamic anal-
ysis. Static analysis is achieved without running the malware and
consists of examining meta-data and patterns in the binaries. On
the other hand, dynamic analysis utilizes artifacts that are generated
by malware at runtime. The process for dynamic analysis entails
executing a malware sample in a controlled environment so that
changes in the environment including network traces, file system
changes, memory access, and registry modifications, are all observed
and recorded. The advantages of static analysis are multifold: static
analysis techniques allow for comprehensive code examination of
malware and are considered fast and scalable because they look
for pre-computed signatures in the binaries. However, attackers can
evade static analysis techniques through code obfuscation. In con-
trast, dynamic analysis is capable of detecting unseen malicious
behavior contained in obfuscated code, but it requires setting up the
sandbox environment and allocating resources for execution, which
is an expensive process.
Typically, execution of a fully-fledged analysis system such as
AMAL [17] requires observing interactions between a binary and
the underlying system’s components, such as memory, file system,
registry and network, for a certain amount of time to extract behav-
ioral artifacts and build a feature vector from which the malware
family is then identified. This, in turn, requires analyzing 100s of
megabytes of memory, various gigabytes of virtual file system space,
several megabytes of the registry, and large network traces of packet
capture.
To reduce the overhead of the dynamic analysis, while benefitting
from its advantages over static analysis, we may utilize either of
two approaches. First, instead of extracting deep features from the
various classes of artifacts, we may only use shallow features. For
example, instead of considering types of DNS responses, types of
DNS records, counts per type, features of queried name servers,
and so forth, we may only consider the total number of queried
domains and returned responses, among others as rather a shallow
feature. Similarly, instead of looking for deep content-based mem-
ory features, we may consider the shallow feature of counts over
memory access. We notice that, while this approach is promising
in reducing the overhead of dynamic execution it is only limited:
shallow features are easy to circumvent to evade detection, and much
of the overhead is consumed in executing the malware, rather than
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Figure 1: The accuracy of classifying malware (ShadyRAT)
based on various classes of artifacts in isolation and combined
(using AMAL [17], a fully-fledged behavior-based malware
analysis system).
analyzing individual artifacts (e.g., online feature extraction can be
done using API hooking [18]).
Another approach to reduce the overhead is by focusing on a
certain class of artifacts, instead of multiple classes. We notice
that not all classes of features are equally important contributors
to the accuracy of malware classifiers. Consider the classification
results shown in Figure 1 of the malware family Shady RAT (simply
ShadyRat, or SRAT), and the contribution of various behavioral
artifact classes in isolation and combined; memory, registry, file
system, and network. We notice that, while the combined features
extracted from the four different classes provide an accuracy of more
than 95%, the accuracy per individual class of features varies, and
ranges from the mid-50% to 75%, indicating that not all classes
of features are equally important. This also suggests that a single
class of behavior has the potential of being used independently for
classifying malware.
However, we note two issues with even with the best class of
features (network). First, it does not provide high enough accuracy
to warrant its use independently. Second, it is unclear how difficult
(and perhaps easy) it would be for an adversary to circumvent a set
of features that rely on a single class of behavioral artifacts. To this
end, the objective of this work is to look into a new type of features
engineered from a single class of behavioral artifacts to boost the
accuracy of classification and to be robust against arbitrary evasions
by the adversary.
Determining the correct abstraction level at which to derive fea-
tures is equally important and yet very challenging [11, 12, 19–21].
Features that accurately represent malware families are an impor-
tant and defining criterion for high-fidelity malware classification.
Furthermore, the level of complexity needed to obtain such abstrac-
tions in operational settings determines the potential of adopting
and accepting such systems at scale. For example, sandboxing and
virtual execution is a privilege that comes with high costs in online
detection systems [22]. When a piece of malware runs on a host,
collecting deep features becomes invasive to users on those hosts. To
this end, while obtaining indicative artifacts and features is very im-
portant, the degree of invasiveness is also a significant consideration
for operational systems.
In this paper, we introduce Chatter, a behavior-based system for
collecting run-time artifacts and feature analysis and derivation, to
address some of those problems. Chatter is a robust system that
relies on the order of the behavioral artifacts that malware samples
generate. Chatter can be implemented as a stand-alone system or
integrated into more robust execution-based systems. As its ground
truth, Chatter relies on labels manually produced by malware an-
alysts. This vetting process requires many man-hours and permits
confident learning, although nicely integrated into the operation of
Chatter. The man-hours, however, are not needed during the online
operation.
To capture the ordering of events in malware execution, Chatter
uses n-grams over abstract behavioral profiles. To boost its efficiency
and achieve various desirable operational properties, Chatter focuses
on one class of behavioral artifacts: network. The use of n-grams in
the context of malware classification is well established. However,
a novel contribution of our work is that it uses n-gram techniques
to encode the order of subsequences of network communication
events. Our hypothesis is that each malware type has a unique com-
munication pattern characterized by a certain order of events. This
hypothesis is supported by Forrest et al. [23] which analyzed Unix
system calls in a similar fashion. Building on this assumption we
attempt to classify malware using only the order of network events.
Our choice of network features is not arbitrary: as discussed in the
rest of the paper, network features are cheaper than file system,
registry, etc. features to obtain. For example, they can be captured
without residing on the same host as the malware being executed.
For our study we looked at three malware families: Zeus, Darkness,
and Shady RAT, representing a diversity of malware intentions.
Contributions. 1) We introduce Chatter, a system for malware anal-
ysis and classification based on inexpensive order-based behavioral
features. We argue for various deployment scenarios, and address
operational needs. 2) We demonstrate the operation of Chatter over
various malware families using only the network interface for the
source of behavioral artifacts. For this evaluation, we rely on man-
ually produced labels. We demonstrate that Chatter is capable of
accurately identifying malware family in a binary classification con-
text. This is achievable even when limiting the number of features
below a quantity commonly used in the related literature. 3) We
demonstrate an in-depth analysis of Chatter across multiple evalua-
tion criteria and outline various open directions.
This paper builds on our work in [24]. While the paper at hand is
almost entirely rewritten, and borrows very little text from [24], it
also incorporates new motivation, new threat model, use model, and
preliminaries, new system description, and new and enhanced exper-
iments and analysis. In particular, we updated sections 1, 2 and 4–7,
while adding 3 to outline threat and use models. Technically, this
work’s extended contribution is towards methodical experiments and
validation: unlike our prior work [24] where we study the perfor-
mance of Chatter in isolation using fixed-length n-gram features, in
this work we systematically evaluate Chatter with network features
only, using fixed length n-gram, combined grams, and utilizing fea-
ture selection for boasted performance (as explained in sections 5.4
and 5.5; with performance gain of more than 20% in accuracy). We
finally evaluate our system over a dozen malware family; section 5.2,
as opposed to three families in [24].
Organization. The organization of this paper is as follows. We
introduce the related work in section 2, preliminaries in section 3,
the design of Chatter in section 4, its evaluation in section 5, and
a discussion in section 6. We sum up with concluding remarks in
section 7.
2 RELATED WORK
The literature is rich with work on malware analysis and classifi-
cation [3, 13, 25–33]. Broadly, the literature is divided into two
schools of thought: signature based and behavior based techniques,
with our work belonging to the latter, and most similar in nature
to [13, 27, 28, 34]. These works and others can be organized accord-
ing to their relationship with techniques utilizing: machine learning
for malware, general behavior-based analysis, memory signatures,
network-related features, evasion prevention, n-grams, and event
ordering. In the following, we elaborate on this research.
Machine learning for Malware. Machine learning techniques have
been used to automate classification of codes and network traffic
in the literature, with hundreds of related studies. The reader can
refer to recent surveys in [35] and [22] for the related work in this
domain.
Behavior-based Analysis. There has been a large number of studies
on using behavioral artifacts for malware analysis and classifica-
tion [19, 26, 36–38]. The work of Bailey et al. in [26] has motivated
many of the related works on behavior-based malware classification.
In [13, 27], the authors use similar techniques for extracting features
and leverage support vector machine (SVM) for classifying malware
samples. Our work distinguishes itself in two respects. Although we
share similarity with their high-level features, our system relies on
the order of events, which exposes richer behavior. Second, we use
analyst-vetted labels for evaluation, whereas the other authors use
heuristics over antivirus (AV)-returned labels.
Traffic analysis. Related to our use of network features is a line
of research on traffic analysis for malware and botnet detection.
Such works include [39–44], with others paying particular attention
to the use of fast-flux techniques [45–50]. Support for our use of
DNS features for malware analysis comes in [51–53]. None of those
studies IS concerned by behavior-based analysis beyond the use of
remotely collected network features for inferring malicious activities
and intention. Our system operates at network interface granularity
to extract malware intelligence.
Evasion detection. Lanzi et al. introduced K-Tracer [54] for extract-
ing kernel malware behavior and mitigating the circumvention of
loggers deployed in the kernel by rootkits. In [55], MacBoost is
used for prioritizing malware samples by distinguishing benign and
malicious code segments. A system to prevent drive-by-malware
based on behavior, named BLADE, is introduced in [56]. A nicely
written survey on such systems and tools is found in [57].
Leveraging n-grams. Using n-grams for malware classification is
not new. However, work in the literature has looked at extracting
features from executables (e.g., sequences of bytes in the binary
files [27]) or streams of communication traffic [58]), but not a higher-
level sequence of events occuring while executing a malware sam-
ple. Other examples of low-level granularity attempts can be found
in [55, 58–60]. Of particular interest is the concurrent work in [58],
which derives n-gram network features for purposes of intrusion
detection. Using network artifacts for identification of malicious
activities, like botnets, is investigated in [41–43, 61, 62]. Further
applications of characterizing malicious domain names using net-
work traffic and artifacts (DNS queries, among others) are reported
in [31, 53, 63].
Mariconti et al. [19] proposed MaMaDroid, an Android malware
detector that builds a behavioral model from sequences of abstracted
application programming interface (API) calls that are performed by
an app as a Markov chain. While MaMaDroid does not specifically
use the n-grams, it has the same effect in capturing the order of
events (here API calls). Similar is the work of Shen et al. [64], where
n-grams are used over data flows to identify the sub-flows order.
Event ordering The basic idea of event order to characterize pro-
cesses was first explored by Forrest et al. in their seminal work [23].
There, it was demonstrated effective for the detection of process-level
intrusions. However, that work differs from ours in three respects:
(1) It is concerned with detection rather than classification, (2) it
uses system calls rather than networks features, and (3) it uses whole
sequences as a single feature that is easy to manipulate, rather than
sub-sequences (as in n-grams) and their frequency.
3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Use Model
Chatter adopts dynamic (network) analysis approach, as opposed to
static analysis approaches, to classify malware using network traces
that are collected by running the binaries in a sandboxed environ-
ment. In other words, and in its operational mode, Chatter does not
rely on host-based artifacts to characterize the behavior of malware,
rather it passively collects network traffic that is generated from
the hosts to synthesize malware behavioral patterns. Because this
approach is less invasive, Chatter reduces the risks of intentional
evasion whereby malware samples may attempt to inject unneces-
sary artifacts in their behavior to fool the dynamic analysis. Notice
that the injection of such random artifacts, by either randomizing
the behavior of the malware or inserting unnecessary behavior, is
possible, and is addressed by Mekky et al. [65].
Chatter consists of the bare-metal host(s) that run in a segregated
(demilitarized) network that is connected to the Internet. A typical
host would have processes associated with various activities includ-
ing software updates, web traffic, and peer-to-peer traffic. Initially,
these hosts are clean and only generate regular traffic, and each host
is infected with only one malware for analysis and is reinitialized
to clean state for every infection. In addition to the analysis hosts,
a monitoring appliance is installed at key points on the network
with a mirrored interface and network traffic is collected on the wire
and analyzed to perform detection and classification of malware. To
the observer on the wire, the whole traffic could be blended from
multiple sources that include regular (background) traffic generated
by the hosts and traffic generated by the malware samples. If the
blended traffic is linearly mixed, then it is sent to a filter module
that uses independent component analysis (ICA)[65] to separate
malware traffic from background traffic. This step is taken before
feature extraction and classification.
3.2 Threat Model
We assume an adversary in the form of a malicious software that
is used to disrupt the operation of computer systems. Chatter is at
heart a profiling system that relies on the behavioral artifact. Thus,
while the adversary’s goal is to remain stealthy, we assume a certain
level of behavior that can be used for extracting features of such
an adversary. For the purpose of this study, we assume that the
behavioral artifacts generated by the adversary are unmixed with
other sources of behavior. We assume that addressing such mixed
behavior, where prevalent, is a secondary goal worth a separate
investigation [65].
While the adversary could be aware of the defender’s capabilities,
including the machine learning techniques, the feature set, and the as-
sociated parameters, the adversary operates under certain constraints
of achieving an end-goal, an attack that would ultimately result in
behavioral artifacts used for its profiling. To this end, while the adver-
sary may try to circumvent the system by manipulating the feature
set to break the classifier, the defender would be aware of such a
behavior to incorporate in further learning. Finally, of particular in-
terest to our study is an adversary that relies on network artifacts for
his operation. In particular, Chatter would operate best when such
network artifacts are prominent in the behavior of the adversary. Mal-
ware that does not use the network, e.g., air gap malware, falls out of
the scope of this work. From our use and threat models, we exclude
the case where malware uses tunneling of encrypted traffic. Despite
continued increase of SSL/TLS-based malware families [66, 67],
however, the majority of malware families (about 80%) still do not
rely on encryption, so we only deal with the samples which do not
generate encrypted traffic in this work.
3.3 The n-Gram Model
In the following, we review the bases of the n-gram model. Interested
readers should refer to [68] for more details.
Let C = {c1, c2, c3, . . . , cℓ} be a set of ℓ unique characters corre-
sponding to the alphabet in a language L. A collection of characters
c1c2c3 . . . cs , where ci ∈ C for 1 ≤ i ≤ s, is said to be a sequence
if this collection is ordered where repetition of elements is allowed.
A word w is a sequence c1c2c3 . . . , where the length of w is the
number of characters in it. A document D is defined as a collection
of words w1w2 . . .wd . Based on that, L is defined as a system for
communication based on words and a combination of them. Both
characters and words are elements (tokens) in documents (strings).
The n-grams are collections of adjacent elements in a string of
tokens with the length of n. Notice that this definition is general, and
it captures n-grams defined for both words and characters in robustly
defined documents (strings) from a language L. n-grams can be used
to compute the probability of a token when the preceding token is
given, using the chain of probability P(c1c2c3 . . . cs ) defined as:
P(c1)P(c2 |c1)P(c3 |c1c2) . . . P(cs |c1 . . . cs−1) =
s∏
k=1
P(ck |c1 . . . ck−1).
For a bigram, we have P(cs1) =
∏s
k=1 P(ck |ck−1). Similarly, we de-
fine the probability approximation forn-gram as P(cs1) =
∏s
k=1 P(ck |ck−1k−n+1),
where the conditional probabilities are estimated using the relative
frequency in D as:
P(cs |cs−1) ≈ C(cs−1cs )
C(cs−1) , P(cs |c
s−1
s−n+1) ≈
C(ccs−1s−n+1cs )
C(cs−1s−n+1)
(1)
One way for building a feature vector for representing a certain
abstraction using L is through the above probability estimation. Al-
ternatively, we can calculate the probability directly by scanning
through D to find all grams that meet the definition above for the
given length n. Defining words over behavioral artifacts is possi-
ble, as examined in [65] using the same toolsets used in this paper.
However, in this paper, and for the development of Chatter, we limit
our attention to the case where behaviors are at the character level:
we do not group those behavioral artifacts and consider the entire
document D as a single word with as many characters as there is in
the original behavioral profile.
4 SYSTEM AND DESIGN
Chatter characterizes malware samples by executing them, using
this intelligence for training purposes. For online operation, this
capability is not required. We proceed by discussing Chatter’s design
goals and then detailing how these are achieved in practice.
4.1 Design Goals and Requirements
In developing Chatter, we have several idealized functional and non-
functional goals in mind. In particular, we develop Chatter so that
it is cost-effective, less invasive, generalizable and multi-purpose,
robust to behavioral changes, and accurate. In the following, we
elaborate on each of those goals.
Cost effectiveness. Feature extraction should be computationally
inexpensive, particularly in online operation. This cost effectiveness
can be achieved by either limiting the number of classes of artifacts
used for characterizing malware to a smaller set (e.g., network only,
as opposed to fully-fledged systems such as AMAL [17], which uses
artifacts that pertain to network, memory, file system and registry
usage) or by deriving shallow features across multiple classes. In
Chatter, we emphasize the first approach by limiting ourselves to
network features only.
Less-invasiveness. While possible to analyze malware in instru-
mented and virtualized environments, which is the approach we
follow for building a baseline, it is desirable to collect such artifacts
while running on the “natural” host OS. A system that can be de-
ployed externally to observe malware is ideal. We keep in mind that
this is only a design objective for the final system, not necessarily a
requirement on how that system is arrived at.
Generalizable and multi-purpose. While the stated goal of Chatter
is to characterize malware samples by their behavior, the system
should be flexible enough for re-purposing outside the malware
realm. In Section 6.3 we show two such applications that benefit
from such generalized capabilities.
Robust to behavioral changes. Given that many malware families
evolve over time to circumvent behavior-based techniques, one goal
of our system is to resist this evolution by providing flexible and
longitudinally-aware techniques.
Accurate. An ideal system for malware classification should aim to
provide the greatest coverage while minimizing false positives. As
such, when designing Chatter, we consider operationally acceptable
accuracy within other optimizations (such as cost-effectiveness) of
particular importance.
4.2 System Workflow and Operation
Chatter’s overall workflow is visualized in Fig. 2. In describing this
workflow we begin with our sandboxed execution environment and
its output. We then describe how this output is transformed to make
use of the n-gram technique to create a feature vector for each mal-
ware sample, which is then used for training a model to classify
various species of malware in an automated manner. We note that
any sandboxed execution environment (or bare-metal execution) can
be used for extracting the features used in Chatter. We use our propri-
etary system named AutoMal, and described in greater depth in [69].
AutoMal requires very little effort to be repurposed as the dynamic
execution component of Chatter. AutoMal is a Windows-based sys-
tem capable of collecting low-granularity artifacts speaking to how
malware samples interact with memory, file system, registry, and
network interfaces. AutoMal takes as input binaries that are likely to
be malware. It consists of 4 components: submitter, controller, work-
ers, and back-end storage. Input samples are queued until resources
become available. The controller initiates virtual machines (VMs),
loads configurations, and runs the malware sample. Once execu-
tion is completed the collected artifacts are logged in the back-end
storage unit.
4.2.1 Sandboxed Execution. Chatter starts its operation by
ingesting malware samples (provided by analysts as part of their
research activities in security operations, customers interested in
understanding classes of malware, or obtained from malware feeds
of antivirus scanners [69]), as shown in step 1 in Fig. 2. Given the
limited resources and large number of samples at any point of time,
our sandboxed execution environment (part of AutoMal [69]) has
a controller that checks for available VMs in the system (or a bare-
metal units) for executing samples from the malware samples queue.
If a VM (or bare-metal unit) is available, the controller runs this VM
with a set of configurations provided by the analyst and executes
the malware sample in the VM. The configurations are passed as a
high-level script by the analyst: those configurations determine the
operating system used in the VM, the virtual devices and resources
associated with the VM, the software packages and programs in-
stalled in the VM, etc.). Upon executing the malware sample for a
certain amount of time, as shown in step 2 in Fig. 2, our fully-fledged
system collects a variety of dynamic execution features. Those in-
clude memory artifacts collected by various memory forensics and
analysis routines (e.g., memory access, memory deletion, memory
modification, size of reads and writes, utilized address space, etc.),
file system artifacts (e.g., counts and content-related artifacts of files
read, written, deleted and modified), registry artifacts (e.g., similar to
the file system artifacts), and network artifacts. The amount of time
a sample is executed is determined by an analyst based on several
considerations, including a high-level notion of malware type and
performance requirements
Because Chatter only relies on one class of artifacts, namely net-
work artifacts, AutoMal is repurposed where only network artifacts
are considered, as shown in step 3 in Fig. 2. Those network artifacts
are collected and indexed with the order of their appearance in the
Table 1: Events used in composing the behavioral documents of
malware samples.
Event class Component events
IP and port unique dest IP, certain ports
Connections TCP, UDP, RAW
Request type POST, GET, HEAD
Response type response codes (200s through 500s)
Size request (quartiles), reply (quartiles)
DNS MX, NS, A records, PTR, SOA, CNAME
execution of the malware sample using timestamps. Among the net-
work artifacts collected by Chatter, we mainly considered high-level
header-based artifacts shown in Table 1. Those artifacts are mainly
header-based, which means that they can be quickly obtained in
real-time while executing the malware sample. We note that other
deeper features from the contents (payload) of the network artifacts
could also be utilized, although we avoid using such artifacts simply
because due to efficiency and scalability reasons.
The artifacts in Table 1 consist of multiple classes, including
IP and port, connection (type), request and response (type), size
information, and DNS-related features. For ports, we focus on a set
of ports that are mostly utilized by malware samples in our analyzed
feeds, some of which are generic services (e.g., ports 20, 21, 22, 25,
53, 80, 102, 110, 143, 389, 443, 465, 587, 636, 993, 995, 6665, 6347,
6679, 6697, and 8080 are used in our analysis). The rest of the (type)
artifacts are as highlighted in Table 1, whereas the size information
is highlighted in quartiles (see [69] for more details). In short, we
define the size of a flow (request or response) as a number between
1 and 4 (inclusive). This number depends on which quartile the size
of the flow fits within. The quartiles are computed over all the flows
(requests and responses) associated with the execution of malware
samples.
4.2.2 Behavioral Documents. Chatter abstracts the raw net-
work behavior and artifacts obtained in step 3 in Fig. 2 to compose
a “behavioral document.” The behavioral document, as shown in
step 4 in the same figure (for illustration purpose only), is simply an
abstracted representation of the network artifacts to simplify their
processing. To compose the behavioral document, we start with the
network artifacts, and by fixing set of “events” (in advance) as shown
in Table 1, we map those events into a set of unique characters in
an arbitrary alphabet. Then, using the network artifacts in step 3
we replace each event with the corresponding character to obtain a
simplified representation of the network artifacts that preserve the
order of the events. For example, in step 4 in Fig. 2, DNS query (of,
say, MX type) is mapped to d, an HTTP request (of, say, type GET)
is mapped to h, and so forth. By mapping the corresponding appear-
ances of the events in the set in Table 1 to the corresponding unique
alphabet for the network behavior of a malware sample (and discard-
ing unmapped behavior), we obtain the “behavioral document”, as
shown in Fig. 2.
4.2.3 n-gram Tokens. The next step in the operation of Chat-
ter is the extraction of n-gram tokens from the behavioral document
using the n-gram technique in section 3.3. By taking as an input a
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Figure 2: Chatter’s sandboxed execution and feature extraction utilizing the network profiling in AutoMal and n-gram-based features
extractor.
parameter n, Chatter calculates the tokens of length n in the behav-
ioral document, such that those tokens consist of adjacent characters
in the behavioral document. For example, as shown in step 6 in
Fig. 2, by starting with a behavioral document of dhrhrhrd, and
for n = 3, Chatter calculates the following tokens as the output of
the n-gram extraction component: dhr, hrh, rhr, hrh, rhr, and
hrd.
4.2.4 n-gram Features. To extract features to represent a mal-
ware sample, we use the frequency of n-gram tokens obtained in the
previous subsection and as illustrated in step 7 in Fig. 2. For instance,
for the sample above, we build an index of the unique tokens and
take the count over those tokens as the feature vector. Namely, for
the same example, the index calculated over the tokens is [dhr, hrh,
rhr, hrd, . . . ] with a feature vector of [1, 2, 2, 1, . . . ]. Note that
the index is calculated over the superset of tokens that appear in the
execution of all malware samples. Furthermore, an index and feature
vectors could be constructed from the union of multiple grams (e.g.,
for an arbitrary n, we may consider the index of the feature vector as
only the unique grams of length n, or all unique grams with a length
less than or equal n; we elaborate more on the choice of the feature
in the evaluation).
4.3 Machine Learning Subsystem
The main purpose of Chatter is to provide means for automated
malware classification using the behavioral features obtained through
dynamic execution. To this end, Chatter supports various supervised
machine learning algorithms for classification. Starting with a golden
labeled dataset, Chatter builds a model utilizing the malware features
extracted in the previous section. Upon validating the model using
standard cross validation and accuracy measures, Chatter then uses
the built model to classify malware in the wild to a family of interest.
A simpler task that we also examine in the evaluation is the power of
Chatter of detecting malware (this is, the classification of software
into two classes of malicious and benign). In the following, we
elaborate on the machine learning component of Chatter, including
procedures and algorithms.
4.3.1 Building Ground Truth. Devising methods for building
ground truth as an open question in the security research commu-
nity in particular and the machine learning in general. Methods
that rely on manual inspection do not scale, whereas automated
signature-based methods that utilize antivirus scanners and labels
are susceptible to inaccuracies and incompleteness. Fortunately, and
as part of our security operations, manually-assigned names and
labels of malware samples were given utilizing the variety of manual
analysis, reversing, and memory signatures. While the method is
costly, if it is to be used only for the operation of Chatter, such
ground truth is obtained independently. We use this ground truth
(more details in the evaluation). However, any other reliable ground
truth source (that could potentially improve over antivirus scanners)
can be utilized for the operation.
4.3.2 Training and Validation. The task that Chatter tries to
achieve is a binary classification: telling if a malware sample belongs
to a malware family (or a class label) of interest or not. Given a set
of malware samples represented by their feature vectors as extracted
in the previous section and the corresponding labels for each sample,
Chatter builds a model for the class of interest and other families
(collectively represented as a second class; in malware detection,
such a class corresponds to benign software). The model is trained
(built) using part of the dataset and validated using the rest of the
dataset. Independent of the algorithm used for building the model
(detailed in section 4.3.3), Chatter uses the k-fold cross-validation
method for building the model, thus addressing the problem of
overfitting. For evaluating Chatter, we use the k-fold cross-validation
method with k = 10. In this method, the input dataset is divided into
k-folds, where k − 1 folds are used for training the machine learning
algorithm and the remaining fold is used for testing. The process
is repeated k-times by changing the testing dataset among the k
possible folds. At the end, the result of the classification algorithm
is computed as the average over the k runs. We set k = 10 due to its
common use.
Upon training the model and testing it, and further establishing
a confidence in the model, the underlying features, and the used
parameters in the algorithm, we use the model in the wild for classi-
fying (or detecting) malware. This is, we assign a label to a malware
sample with the unknown label based on the determination made by
our model for the given algorithm (details of how such determination
is done is the testing phase of the algorithms in the next section;
4.3.3).
4.3.3 Machine Learning Algorithms. Three machine learn-
ing algorithms are supported by Chatter: 1) the k-nearest neighbor
(k-NN), 2) support vector machine (SVM), and 3) decision tree
classifiers. All three algorithms are intended for binary supervised
learning and are capable of identifying the membership of a mal-
ware sample into one of two classes. Details on the operation of
those algorithms are provided below for the completeness of our
presentation of Chatter.
Support vector machines (SVM). Given a training set of labeled
pairs (xi ,yi ) for 0 < i ≤ ℓ, xi ∈ Rn , and yi ∈ {1,−1}, the
(L2-regularized primal) SVM solves the following optimization:
minw,b,ξ 12w
Tw + C
∑ℓ
i=1 ξi subject to yi (wTϕ(xi ) + b) ≥ 1 − ξi ,
ξi ≥ 0, where the training vectors xi are mapped into a higher di-
mensional space using the function ϕ, and the SVM finds a linear
separating hyperplane with the maximal margin in this space. C > 0
is the penalty parameter of the error term (set to 0.01 in this work).
ξ (w, x,yi ) is called the loss function, where we use the L2-loss
defined as ξ (w, x,yi ) = max(1 − yiwT xi , 0)2.
Decision trees. In evaluating Chatter, we utilize a single split tree for
two-class classification using all of the features provided by Chatter.
In particular, we use a small variation of the C4.5 algorithm. For a
target class label Y = y1, . . . ,yn (here, n = 2) and a set of feature
vectors x1 . . . , xf , at each internal node of the tree we apply a test
to one of the inputs, namely xi , determining whether to go left or
right in the tree branches based on the outcome of the test. When
running over all of the training feature vectors, we mark the leaf
nodes as the aggregate (mean) of all the training samples (to one
of the class labels in Y ). For testing, we do the same and assign the
label of the leaf to that of the sample feature vector used to reach
the leaf. There are variations of decision trees in the literature to
provide better results (e.g., random forests). We did not try any of
those techniques since this technique provided reasonable results.
We leave integration of such techniques as future work.
The k-nearest-neighbor. The k-NN is a non-linear classification
algorithm. In the training phase, we provide the algorithm two la-
bels and a set of training samples (that are simply stored for the
testing phase). In the testing phase, for each sample vector a, we
assign the label most frequent among the training samples nearest
(using the Euclidean distance) to a. We refer the reader to a textbook
explanation of the technique in [70].
5 EVALUATION
To evaluate our work we begin by describing the malware samples
utilized and how ground-truth is produced. This data is put through
the Chatter workflow and feature vectors are computed. We then
apply our machine learning technique of choice, producing eval-
uation metrics which are then interpreted with respect to system
performance.
5.1 Ground-truth and Labeling
Labeling malware to establish a ground-truth is an important step
in any supervised classification task. Prior literature relies heavily
on family labels and names provided by anti-virus scanners. Several
recent works [22, 26, 71] have shown such scans to be unreliable.
This is understandable to some extent, as these AV scanners are
often designed with the primary goal of distinguishing malware
from benign code – not distinguishing between malware families.
To this end, the malware samples we utilize have been collected
over a considerable period of time, enabling expert analysts in
Verisign’s organization to manually identify and label them. This
process is time-consuming; a previously unseen malware sample
averages 10+ hours of manual characterization. However, family
Table 2: Malware families used in the evaluation of Chatter, in-
cluding set size and the average number of events per execution
trace.
Family Quantity Ch. Avg. Description
Avzhan 3458 70.31 Commercial DDoS bot
Darkness 1878 61.47 Commercial DDoS bot
Ddoser 502 57.51 Commercial DDoS bot
N0ise 431 77.13 Commercial DDoS bot
Jkddos 333 120.3 Commercial DDoS bot
Shady RAT 1287 52.74 targeted; government and corps
Getkys 953 63.04 targeted; targets medical sector
DNSCalc 403 82.37 targeted; US defense companies
Lurid 399 50.41 targeted; initially targeted NGOs
Zeus 1975 50.74 Banking, targets credentials
ZeroAccess 568 49.93 Rootkit, monetized by click-fraud
discovery is done in parallel with other important tasks. This time is
not spent analyzing the binary just for this research initiative. Instead,
Verisign analysts are contracted by customers to produce detailed
reports on the modus operandi of a malware sample.
In addition to customer submitted binaries, partnering anti-virus
vendors and analyst’s research endeavors also contribute to our
malware repository. Yara signatures [72] are sometimes applied to
weed out irrelevant samples and a system called AMAL [69] is
applied to characterize samples from well-understood families. We
emphasize that the majority of samples used in this study come
from customers, where manual efforts are used for the labeling of
samples.
5.2 Dataset and Malware Samples
For the evaluation of Chatter, we use 11 malware families used in
[8]: Avzhan, Darkness, Ddoser, Jkddos, N0ise, Shady RAT (SRAT),
DNSCalc, Lurid, Getkeys, ZeroAccess, and Zeus. As we will soon
describe, these families cover a wide range of network behavior.
Our system is applicable for all malware families and our proof-of-
concept selection is for demonstration purposes. Subsequent to the
analysis described herein, we also ran our system on other families,
including Ramnit, Bredolab, SillyFDC, and Virut. The systems’
operation and accuracy during these larger trials were consistent for
the results we present for our 11-family experiments.
Each malware sample in these families is obtained from an op-
erational product, where sources of the malware samples include
Verisign customers, partnering antivirus vendors, and researchers.
Once the malware samples are fed into AutoMal they are executed
for a fixed amount of time to generate artifacts. Table 2 reports on
the quantity of the sample we virtualized and the average document
length that resulted. To foster transparency and reproducibility of
results, we release the dataset used in this work to the larger commu-
nity. We note that the different families in our dataset belong to one
of three classes: DDoS, targeted, or mass-market malware.
For every malware family set, we also have an equally-sized sam-
ple of random malware samples drawn from an expansive malware
repository. In our proof-of-concept evaluation, we, therefore, treat
family membership as a binary classification task. We now discuss
each of these families in greater depth:
⋄ Zeus. One of the Trojans that attack financial sector through steal-
ing information from the infected computers. To steal credentials,
this Trojan hooks Windows API functions responsible for the com-
munication between clients and the bank’s website and modifies the
returning results to hide its activities.
⋄ Avzhan. The DDoS botnet that was first reported in 2010 [73].
This botnet is similar to IMDDos, a Chinese process-based botnet
announced by Damballa around September 2010 [74], where both
families can be commercially hired to attack targets of interests.
The owners of the botnet claim on their website that their botnet
can strictly be hired to attack non-legitimate websites, for instance,
gambling sites.
⋄ Darkness. a.k.a. Optima, is a commercial malware family devel-
oped by Russian criminals and released in 2009. As of the end of
2011, the 10th generation of this bot was released. This malware
performs several functions, including launching DDoS attacks, steal-
ing credentials and using infected machines for launching traffic
tunneling attacks [75].
⋄DDoSer. a.k.a. Blackenergy, was reported and analyzed in 2007 [76],
is a DDoS malware that is capable of performing HTTP DDoS at-
tacks. This malware is unique in the sense that it can target more
than one IP address per DNS record.
⋄ JKDDoS. Malware that targets the mining industry [77]. The
malware was first reported by Arbor Networks in 2011, and its first
generation was observed in September 2009.
⋄ N0ise. The DDoS tool used to recruit other bots to attack vic-
tims using HTTP, UDP, and ICMP flood, among other methods.
Other functionalities of this tool include stealing credentials and
downloading and executing other malware [78].
⋄ ShadyRat. is a targeted malware that is used to steal sensitive
information like trade secrets, patent technologies, and internal doc-
uments. The malware employs a stealthy technique when commu-
nicating with the C2 by using a combination of encrypted HTML
comments in compromised pages or steganography in images up-
loaded to a website [79].
⋄DNSCalc. a.k.a. APT12, is a malware is targeted towards research
sector, where it steals sensitive information through using the re-
sponses from the DNS request to calculate the IP address and the
port number used for communication [80].
⋄Lurid. Malware that targeted US government and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), although it seems that there is no relationship
between the targets indicators. This perhaps implies that the malware
family is being used commercially as a hit man [81]. Three hundred
attacks launched by this malware family were targeted towards 1,465
victims and were persistent via monitoring using 15 domain names
and 10 active IP addresses.
⋄Getkys. a.k.a. Skyipot, is a single-stage Trojan that targets aerospace,
defense, and think tank organizations, through running and inject-
ing itself in three targeted processes: outlook.exe, iexplorer.exe
and firefox.exe. This Trojan communicates via HTTP requests and
uses two unique and identifiable URL formats, such as the string
“getkys” [82].
⋄ ZAccess. a.k.a. ZeroAccess, is a rootkit-based Trojan that targets
most Windows OS and was reported first by Symantec in July 2011.
The Trojan is mainly used to enable other malicious functions on the
Table 3: The number of unique n-grams actually observed in
each of the studied families for varying values of n.
Family / n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Avzhan 24 102 248 476 910 1506 2304 3252
Darkness 24 103 243 461 875 1503 2266 3149
Ddoser 26 107 250 491 900 1606 2636 3776
N0ise 24 106 249 480 891 1678 2264 3626
Jkddos 25 103 244 469 941 1703 2307 3122
SRAT 25 105 247 460 877 1536 2337 3300
Getkys 24 102 242 470 893 1659 2277 3364
DNSCalc 26 107 249 468 907 1578 2292 3379
Lurid 25 103 243 467 956 1539 2354 3130
Zeus 24 102 250 481 943 1690 2638 3794
ZeroAccess 26 108 250 489 913 1520 2306 3368
infected machine based on a pay-per-click advertising model. ZAc-
cess is generally used to download other malware, open backdoors
on the infected machines, among other functions [83].
5.3 Feature Space and Space Reduction
Running a malware sample in a sandboxed environment results in
many artifacts and large PCAP files. Not all of these artifacts and
the associated features are relevant nor meaningful in identifying
a malware sample. Thus, we rely on expert domain knowledge to
identify the network-related events of interest. To this end, Table 1
highlights some of the 26 network-related events used in our anal-
ysis. Per Table 3, we observe that some events do not occur for
some families (e.g., n = 1) and far greater unique combinations of
events never occur (e.g., where n > 1 there is no permutation-scale
growth). This makes empirical the advantages of using the sparse
feature representation. For example, when n = 8 our feature vector
needs only ≈ 3,800 entries (the size of the feature space), rather
than the 2.0811 entries needed for exhaustive representation of all
combinations when n = 8.
5.4 Evaluation Metrics and Scenarios
For a binary classification problem, in which it is required to deter-
mine if a given malware sample belongs to the class of interest S or
not, we define the following possibilities: (1) True positives (Tp ) are
those samples correctly identified by the machine learning algorithm
to belong to the class S . (2) False positives (Fp ) are those samples
incorrectly marked by the machine learning algorithm to belong to
S . (3) True negative (Tn) are those samples marked by the machine
learning algorithm correctly not to belong to S . (4) False negative
(Fn) are those samples incorrectly marked by the machine learning
algorithm not to belong to S (they are actually in S). Using these
outcomes and associated magnitudes, the precision, recall, accuracy,
and F1 score are defined as:
Precision (P) = Tp/(Tp + Fp ), (2)
Recall (R) = Tp/(Tp + Fn ), (3)
Accuracy (A) = (Tp +Tn )/(Tp +Tn + Fp + Fn ), (4)
F1 score (F1) = 2 × (P × R)/(P + R). (5)
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Figure 3: Performance measures for the Shadyrat malware fam-
ily with network artifact classification using Chatter atop a
baseline classifier
In the subsequent analysis, we scale all evaluation metrics to a
percentage range by multiplying the result by 100.
Scenarios. In experimenting with Chatter, we consider the following
scenarios. 1) Using all features resulting from the n-gram representa-
tion for a given n. 2) Using the combination of all features resulting
from the n-gram, inclusive of all features with a gram of size less
than or equal to n; this is, when a given n is used the feature set
would include, grams of size n . . . 1. 3) Using the top significant
features selected using the recursive features selection (RFS). RFS
takes in two inputs, k value, indicating the number of features de-
sired, and n features. RFS generates n − 1 models by removing 1
feature from the n features, then evaluates each n − 1 model, then se-
lects the best performing model. The process continuesm steps until
k = n −m. 4) Using multiple algorithms on the same set of features
to understand the impact of different algorithms on the performance
of our classifiers.
5.5 Quantitative Results
We now present results from our evaluation. This section consists
primarily of quantitative results, whereas later sections analyze and
discuss these results in greater depth.
Results in isolation: For this evaluation, we use three families that
represent the three different malware classes in our dataset: Zeus
(mass-market), Darkness (DDoS), and ShadyRat (targeted). The
main purpose of this experiment is to understand the power of vari-
ous machine learning algorithms and parameters when studying our
datasets and preliminary features in isolation. Thus, we start with
n = 1, which corresponds to the bag-of-words method in the litera-
ture [17], the three aforementioned machine learning algorithms, the
four evaluation metrics, and the three malware families. The results
are shown in Figs. 3, 4, and 5. Among other observations, we notice
the following. First, the performance, across all evaluation metrics,
of the baseline feature is insufficient in almost all cases of malware
families. Second, the performance of our baseline experiment varies
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Figure 4: Performance measures for the Darkness malware fam-
ily with network artifact classification using Chatter atop a
baseline classifier
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Figure 5: Performance measures for the Zeus DDoS malware
family with network artifact classification using Chatter atop a
baseline classifier
greatly across families, and best results across all evaluation metrics
is obtained with mass-market malware (Zeus), followed by DDoS
malware (Darkness), then by targeted malware (ShadyRat), which is
unsurprising pattern that holds for other malware families as verified
through our analyses. Third, across all experiments, we notice that
SVM provides the best results across all evaluation metrics, and the
ranking of the two other algorithms is inconsistent and depends on
the family studied. However, in all cases, the difference between the
different algorithms is insignificant.
Based on the baseline established in the first observation, we
pursue the study of the impact of the n-gram features, and how
they impact the performance of classification. Based on the third
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Figure 6: The accuracy of classifying various malware families
with varying n.
observation, we limit our attention to the SVM as the algorithm of
choice when studying the impact of the n-gram parameters on the
performance of classification. For the lack of space, we also only
evaluate our system based on its accuracy. In the subsequent analysis,
we perform classification for all of the eleven malware families in
our dataset.
Evaluation using individual n-gram features. In this experiment,
we focus on how using the new set of n-gram features affect the
performance of the classifier. For this experiment, we use the SVM
as the classifier of choice, for its better performance in the previ-
ous experiments. We study the performance over all families. In
running Chatter, we use individual features resulting from using
the parameter n. Where n is fixed, only features of n consecutive
events are used in our feature vector. Results are shown in Table 4.
Based on those results, we make two observations. First, there is a
monotonically increasing trend in the accuracy of the SVM classifier
with the increase of the parameter n, even without features selection.
This improved performance is clear across the board. Second, we
notice, by experimenting with the 11 families in our dataset, a con-
sistent ranking of the power of network-based features in general,
and Chatter in particular, in profiling, characterizing, and detecting
mass-market and DDoS families than the targeted families. This
insight is further highlighted in the ordering of three sample families
belong to each class, in Fig. 6.
Evaluation using combined n-gram features. In this scenario, and
for a given n, we compile a set of features for all combinations of
events that are consecutive and are of the length less than or equal
to n. For example, where n = 3, we include features for lengths
1, 2, and 3. The results are shown in Table 5. Overall, we notice
an improved accuracy across the board in classifying the various
families.
Evaluation with selected features. In the following, we show the
results with features selection over the previous experiment. In par-
ticular, we limit our attention to the 10% top features in each family
and compute the accuracy of the classifier for the different families.
The results are shown in Table 6. Overall, we notice an improvement
across the board. More importantly, we notice a final classification
accuracy of 83%-98.9%, as compared to an initial accuracy of 62.1%-
91.2% (with more than half of the families having the accuracy of
less than 80%). Notice that this improvement in accuracy is not
Table 4: Accuracy of classifying various families for different
values of n when calculating the n-gram individual features.
family / n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Avzhan 74.2 74.8 76.5 76.7 78.7 83.5 86.0 91.2
Darkness 81.1 81.4 83.4 85.2 85.8 86.5 86.8 87.6
Ddoser 84.1 84.9 85.6 86.5 92.8 93.5 93.7 94.1
N0ise 88.0 88.1 88.8 89.2 90.7 91.8 91.8 92.4
Jkddos 75.4 76.1 79.1 85.2 85.3 85.6 85.9 87.7
ShadyRat 62.1 62.8 67.5 68.6 75.3 79.0 80.3 82.9
Getkys 72.9 72.9 73.2 74.8 75.8 77.0 78.5 79.8
DNSCalc 75.7 77.0 78.2 78.4 79.4 81.3 83.5 84.4
Lurid 66.5 67.3 68.2 69.7 76.5 77.5 77.7 85.7
Zeus 91.2 91.2 91.4 92.6 92.8 93.5 93.6 94.2
ZeroAccess 83.3 83.8 84.6 84.8 89.7 91.6 92.9 93.0
Table 5: Accuracy of classifying various families for different
values of n when calculating the n-gram combined features.
family / n 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-7 1-8
Zeus 93.2 93.5 93.9 94.0 94.1 95.3 96.2
ZeroAccess 84.9 85.2 85.3 90.6 94.1 94.5 95.2
ShadyRat 63.2 68.2 71.2 75.7 79.4 82.8 85.8
Getkys 74.7 76.1 76.7 77.3 78.2 79.8 82.6
DNSCalc 78.3 79.4 79.9 80.7 84.2 85.4 86.0
Lurid 69.0 70.0 71.2 78.1 78.9 79.2 88.4
AVZhan 77.3 79.1 79.4 81.3 83.9 87.5 93.2
Darkness 83.7 83.9 86.6 86.8 87.6 88.7 89.8
Ddoser 86.4 86.5 88.6 93.7 94.5 95.4 96.0
N0ise 89.3 90.3 90.5 92.9 92.9 93.1 93.6
Jkddos 78.5 81.0 85.5 85.5 87.9 88.5 89.4
Table 6: Accuracy of classifying malware families with varying
n values with recursive feature selection.
family / n 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-7 1-8
Zeus 94.2 95.2 95.8 96.4 96.5 97.0 98.9
ZeroAccess 85.9 85.9 89.1 93.4 94.5 94.5 95.9
ShadyRat 66.5 69.5 71.4 78.9 83.7 84.5 86.8
Getkys 75.9 76.2 76.4 77.7 80.8 81.6 83.0
DNSCalc 78.9 80.2 81.8 82.4 82.6 85.6 86.2
Lurid 70.0 71.7 74.4 77.2 80.0 82.1 89.6
AVZhan 78.3 79.2 81.9 81.9 87.4 88.4 94.9
Darkness 86.8 87.8 87.9 88.6 89.4 90.4 90.9
Ddoser 88.3 89.9 91.8 96.2 96.8 97.0 97.3
N0ise 91.3 91.9 92.8 93.8 94.4 96.6 97.2
Jkddos 79.1 81.1 88.1 88.4 89.4 90.3 93.6
the only improvement, but also includes a massive speed-up for the
reduction in the number of features used for classification to only
the most significant (10%).
6 DISCUSSION
When n = 1 ordering plays no role, whereas there are tremendous
ordered dependencies when n = 8 (our upper limit). We observe
that malware families tend to peak in performance when n = 8. This
observation is further validated when combining features and feature
selection. The accuracy graphs in Figs. 3, 4 and 5 show an upward
trend as n grows. We conclude that order does improve classification
by about 7% to 23%.
6.1 Meeting Design Requirements
In the following we highlight how Chatter meets the design require-
ments outlined in Section 4.1:
⋄ Cost-effectiveness. Chatter’s cost-effectiveness is two-fold: (1) It
uses only a single class of (network) artifacts, and (2) It abstracts
features from curated event traces rather than raw interface dumps.
Prior literature has shown a system characterizing malware using
only network artifacts can run an order of magnitude faster than
a system that looks at a large spectrum of features. For example,
AMAL [69] is a fully-featured infrastructure that ideally utilizes
128 virtual machines towards processing 23,000 malware samples
daily. Chatter, on the other hand, could process 370,000 malware
samples per day using the same infrastructure. This number signifi-
cantly exceeds the sample quantity Verisign’s operations receive and
analyze on a daily basis. Indeed, the number is also greater than the
250,000 samples a popular antivirus provider like Sophos detects
and analyzes daily [84].
⋄ Less-invasiveness. Using network features makes Chatter less
invasive. The network events can be gleaned on the network without
having to reside on the host machine. However, this capability is
also susceptible to noise from other system processes using the
network interface in parallel with the malware sample. This could
be limited by running the malware and the host in a monitored mode
of operation.
⋄ Generalization and flexibility. Chatter’s ability to evolve with
malware binaries is straightforward given its operational context.
Because novel malware is being created, analyst efforts continue
to be brought to bear on samples’ reverse-engineering and analysis.
Family labels are a cheap side-effect of this ongoing demand, result-
ing in a wealth of expert-annotated and longitudinal ground-truth
that can be utilized via periodic retraining.
⋄ Accuracy. In isolation, Chatter’s accuracy is less than that of
full-featured systems, e.g., AMAL [69]. However, we still contend
that our performance is operationally acceptable. The contexts in
which one needs to make a family classification are very different
when determining the presence of malware. Remember also that
accuracy can be improved by using more expensive techniques (pos-
sibly as a second-pass if Chatter’s models indicate low classification
confidence). This work is also interested in the trade-off between
complexity, accuracy, and operational costs.
6.2 System Limitations
We acknowledge various shortcomings of Chatter, and examine how
a knowledgeable attacker could utilize gamesmanship to circumvent
our classification strategy.
Noised features. As with most behavior-based systems for malware
classification, Chatter performs best when malware samples do not
produce extra information to disguise their behavior and manipulate
machine learning algorithms. However, unlike systems that make
use of exact matching of behavior profiles, Chatter provides some
flexibility and robustness in the grouping patterns based on n-gram
features. The problem is a generic one which we address in two
ways. First, we emphasize that not all the features generated by a
malware sample need to be used by learning algorithm: a feature
selection algorithm can be used to reduce the impact of the noised
features. Second, regardless of injected noise, certain events in the
operation of a malware sample must happen in the same partial order.
Our future work to address this limitation is to derive features of
those events as they happen in their partial order by filtering out
the noise between them. While this might seem to require a deep
understanding of the studied malware families and their expected be-
havior, well-understood signal processing techniques show potential
in this domain.
Adaptive malware. Certain forms of malware are capable of chang-
ing their behavior based on the environment in which they are run.
This creates issues for Chatter as it does for other behavior-based
sandboxes. We address this in two ways:
First, AutoMal, the sandbox environment for Chatter generates
patches to deceive malware samples by providing registry values
indicating execution is occurring on bare metal. Second, for sophis-
ticated malware that does not respond to those patches, malware
samples are actually run on bare metal (or using hardware virtu-
alization). Of course, this a problem specific to the generation of
behavior profiles, whereas actual operation is unaffected by such
manipulations.
Continuous training and cost of labeling: Because of the evolution
of malware samples, continuous training is needed in our system to
adapt to changes in artifacts generated. While this issue might seem
an inherent shortcoming for machine learning based techniques, it
is addressed naturally in Chatter. As mentioned earlier, many of the
malware samples fed into Chatter belong to customers and require
reverse engineering, deep analysis, and manual inspection. To that
end, this process provides a natural venue for obtaining features,
labels, and training sets for Chatter.
Our objective in this work is characterizing a threat model against
Chatter by defining ways where an adversary can alter the pattern
of network traces when running malware samples in a dynamic
analysis environment. An adversary may alter the sequence of traces
in various ways hoping to confuse monitoring systems and to make
the extracted features less discriminatory, either by injecting new
packets into the network or modifying existing ones or dropping
packets in transit if they can intercept them.
We argue that sensitivity of classification in Chatter is affected
by environmental noise or by malicious actions intended to poison
traces of execution using operations like: addition, deletion, and
modification of behavioral events. Consequently, an adversary who
executes these operations seeks to record distorted patterns as input
to the classifier and therefore hopes to evade detection by generat-
ing faulty results. We identify potential attacks that can target the
classifier and affect the overall performance of Chatter. Each of
those attacks, while ranging in sophistication, rely on unique and
basic features of the proposed approach for discriminatory feature
extraction. These attacks can be modeled by simple linear combina-
tion attacks or they can be more sophisticated such as non-linear or
spatial attacks.
Linear attacks. With linear attacks, the source of the attack can
be modeled as a linear combination of background traffic gener-
ated from regular hosts (based on web browsing, software updates,
. . . etc) with network events generated by the malware sample. Noise
in the behavioral sequence can affect the classifier’s performance
and to overcome this requires either applying a proper filter or use
of tight monitoring in sandboxed environments. However, malware
samples may actually simulate linear noise by injecting unneces-
sary artifacts in their behavior to fool the dynamic analysis, thus
mimicking background traffic and evading detection by simulat-
ing multi-blended traffic. Methods such as independent component
analysis (ICA) can be used to separate linearly combined traffic
by analyzing distributions of features extracted from mixed traces
into two estimated distributions, provided that traffic sources are
statistically independent.
Non-linear attacks. Unlike linear attacks which assume traffic is
linearly mixed, spatial attacks are based on non-linear combina-
tions of the features that exhibit spatial distortion properties. Two
techniques seemed promising for defending against spatial attacks,
namely: sequence alignment and skip-grams. Sequence alignment
is a well-established method in bioinformatics used for identify-
ing regions of similarity between two sequences that might be a
consequence of functional, structural or evolutionary relationships.
Typically, a ground truth of clean sequence is used to align vari-
ous noisy sequences. On the other hand, skip-grams can be used
to model noisy sequences by finding the pattern of characters (or
words) that do not have to be consecutive. For example, a 1-skip
grams algorithm would be applied the same way as 2-grams, but by
skipping a word in every two grams in the analyzed document. They
are considered a generalization of n-grams model which can be used
to overcome noise in the sequence.
6.3 Other Applications
While the main application we used in Chatter relies on transforming
behavioral profiles into documents and using them for understanding
the behavior of malware utilizing n-gram techniques, the concept
is generic and can be applied to a wide variety of applications. In
the following we identify several potential applications which can
benefit from Chatter: (1) Process-based DDoS detection: While our
system studies a specific DDoS malware family, our system can be
generalized to understand any process-based DDoS attack by observ-
ing traffic on the wire, generating sufficient artifacts that can be used
to derive features and footprint such attacks. (2) Advanced persistent
threats: Often such threats (process-based) result in many artifacts
that are generated over a long period of time, rendering research
systems less effective in characterizing them. One potential area
of improvement is to rely on the inter-event patterns they generate,
using Chatter.
One potential application to the technique is what we term as the
“adversary incubation”, in which an attacker is led into a controlled
environment and observed over a long period of time. The behavior
of the adversary can be then used to characterize him and using
his network activities in particular. We notice that the adversary
incubation is one step for understanding the “advanced persistent
threat” (APT), and is widely used in the industry. The incubation
usually result in network artifacts generated by the adversary and
spread over a long period of time, as a result of low rate activities
that the adversary hope to go unseen by anomaly detection defenses.
Utilizing systems like AMAL for understanding the adversary might
not be as effective, whereas using the inter-event patterns of actions
taken by the adversary may reveal valuable about the attacker and
help attributing attacks to him.
7 CONCLUSION
Motivated by the need for deriving new and easy-to-obtain features,
we introduced Chatter, a behavior-based malware classification sys-
tem. Chatter uses behavioral artifacts generated by malware samples
at runtime to characterize malware. At its core, Chatter considers the
order in which behavioral events occur. We notice that order-based
features can be captured and analyzed using the n-gram technique
widely used in document classification. With its many advantages
enumerated in Section 4, and using three malware families, Chatter
is shown to be reasonably accurate at classifying malware samples
into their respective families.
This paper considered order-based behavioral features for clas-
sification of malware samples in its simplest form. Addressing the
limitations outlined in Section 6.2 is the immediate future work. In
particular, we would like to explore partial-order features for fin-
gerprinting malware samples. Those features would address noised
features (both intentional obfuscation by malware authors, and unin-
tentional, due to mixed signals on-the-wire). Realizing the applica-
tions listed in Section 6.3 using the Chatter methodology is another
future work that we would like to explore.
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